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Disgust modulates moral decisions involving harming others. We recently specified that
this effect is bi-directionally modulated by individual sensitivity to disgust. Here, we show
that this effect generalizes to the moral domain of honesty and extends to outcomes
with real-world impact. We employed a dice-rolling task in which participants were
incentivized to dishonestly report outcomes to increase their potential final monetary
payoff. Disgust or control facial expressions were presented subliminally on each trial.
Our results reveal that the disgust facial expressions altered honest reporting as a
bi-directional function moderated by individual sensitivity. Combining these data with
those from prior experiments revealed that the effect of disgust presentation on both harm
judgments and honesty could be accounted for by the same bidirectional function, with
no significant effect of domain. This clearly demonstrates that disgust facial expressions
produce the same modulation of moral judgments across different moral foundations
(harm and honesty). Our results suggest strong overlap in the cognitive/neural processes
of moral judgments acrossmoral foundations, and provide a framework for further studies
to specify the integration of emotional information in moral decision making.
Keywords: decision making, moral, dishonesty, disgust, sensitivity, individual differences, social, cheating
Introduction
While dishonest Wall Street bankers and philandering politicians are roundly condemned in the
court of public opinion, most people are not themselves perfectly honest. Small infractions, when
multiplied over a population, can have a massive impact on society—for example, it is estimated
that the US government has a half-trillion-dollar tax shortfall each year due to millions of US
citizens under-reporting their income (Feige and Cebula, 2011). Considering its huge societal
impact, dishonesty is an understudied phenomenon for which small interventions could produce
large societal windfalls. Specifically, studying the modulation of moral judgment by social and
emotional factors could point toward interventions to facilitate judgments across moral domains.
Making moral decisions involves the integration of multiple decision inputs, including
utilitarian components (e.g., expected outcomes), deontological rules (e.g., “thou shalt not steal”),
and socio-emotional factors. The socio-emotional factors have been the focus of much recent
research (Greene et al., 2001;Wheatley and Haidt, 2005; Cummins and Cummins, 2012), andmany
investigators have tested the effects of disgust induction on moral judgments in particular due to
their strong theoretical links (Rozin et al., 1999; Hutcherson andGross, 2011). Early work suggested
that disgust increases the severity of moral judgments by encouraging rule-based (deontological)
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over utilitarian thinking (Schnall et al., 2008a,b). However, a
number of other studies have since contradicted these initial
findings (La Rosa et al., 2012; Ugazio et al., 2012; Ong et al., 2014).
We recently specified that disgust primes modulate judgments
of moral dilemmas based upon a third variable: individual
sensitivity to disgust (Ong et al., 2014). In this series of
experiments, we confirmed that disgust primes modulated the
acceptability ratings of utilitarian actions. However, the direction
and degree of that effect was moderated (r = 0.47) by
each participant’s sensitivity to disgust (Disgust-Scale Revised,
Olatunji et al., 2007). Specifically, individuals with high disgust
sensitivity found the utilitarian actions more acceptable, while
low-sensitivity individuals found them less acceptable. This
finding led us to suggest that the previous contradictory reports
in the literature could be explained by this bi-directional
function—as the identified modulation would be dependent on
the mean disgust sensitivity of the investigated sample.
In our prior work, we used trolley-car, or sacrificial, dilemmas,
in which participants judged the moral acceptability of an action
that would hurt or kill one person to save multiple others
(Foot, 1967; Unger, 1996; Greene et al., 2001). Such scenarios
are helpful for initial exploration of moral decision-making
processes; however, they may have low ecological validity as
they are hypothetical and sometimes set in artificial or far-
fetched contexts (Bauman et al., 2014; Kahane, 2015). This
concern motivated us to probe the robustness of our found
function using a non-hypothetical moral task. To achieve this, we
employed a simple incentive-compatible monetary task that has
been previously shown to elicit cheating behavior (Jiang, 2013;
Ariely et al., 2014).
For each trial of this task (Figure 1), subjects roll a six-sided
die, from which they report the value of a pre-chosen side.
Critically, they perform the task with little supervision and may
easily write down each value dishonestly if they choose to do
FIGURE 1 | Schematic of one trial of the task paradigm. Subjects first
performed the gender discrimination task, during which they were primed
subliminally with a facial image with either a disgust or neutral expression.
They then mentally selected “top” or “bottom” before rolling a physical die
and writing down the outcome (which may not have been the true outcome
of their decision).
so. Further, the monetary payments participants received were
dependent on the values that they reported, motivating them to
cheat. To test the effect of our emotional modulation on this
task, we primed subjects subliminally with a disgusted facial
expression before half of the die-rolling trials, and compared the
likely amount of dishonest reporting between this condition and
the control of neutral facial expressions.
While it has been demonstrated that disgust can modulate
the judgment of dishonest acts (Wheatley and Haidt, 2005), a
recent fMRI study has also suggested that moral judgments of
harm, dishonesty, and purity violations are subserved by distinct
neural systems (Parkinson et al., 2011). This motivated us to test
whether the bi-directional function we found using sacrificial
dilemmas generalizes from the domain of harm to the domain
of dishonesty. We tested the specific hypothesis that we would
replicate our previous bi-directional function (Ong et al., 2014);
that is, we predicted that priming with disgust facial expressions
would modulate cheating behavior based on individual disgust
sensitivity. In our previous experiment, individuals low on
disgust sensitivity were less likely to endorse the acceptability of
utilitarian actions, that is, relying more heavily on deontological
rules. We predicted a parallel result in the honesty domain: that
low sensitivity would lead to a decreased likelihood of cheating
(i.e., a greater tendency to abide by the rules of the experiment)
and high sensitivity reducing this likelihood.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Participants were recruited via online advertisements on the
National University of Singapore web portal and by word-of-
mouth. Participants were screened to ensure that they had not
previously participated in moral decision-making experiments
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conducted by our group. Fifty one participants (17 male) from
ages 19 to 27 [mean = 21.6(2.15)] were recruited. Data from
one participant was not recorded due to technical difficulties.
Participants gave written consent before taking part in the study,
and all tasks and procedures were approved by the Institutional
Review Board of the National University of Singapore. A
priori, we decided upon a sample size of 50 participants based
on our found effects in the harm vignette studies (see Ong
et al., 2014, which featured three samples of ∼30 participants),
and our desire to be able to identify potentially weaker
effects.
Procedure
Testing was conducted at the Centre for Life Sciences at
the National University of Singapore. Each participant was
run individually, with a single research assistant conducting
all sessions. This research assistant was present in the room
during the entire experiment, but was blind to the order of
conditions for the participant. In order to mitigate experimenter-
expectancy effects, verbal communication with the participant
was minimized and the research assistant sat with his back to the
participant during data collection.
Participants were first briefed on the gender discrimination
and dice-rolling paradigms (see below), and practiced two trials
with neutral priming. They were allowed to select the die they
would use from a tray of a dozen identical dice. Importantly,
they were then informed that their payment would be determined
by random selection of one of the trials at the conclusion of
the experiment, paid at a rate of 1 Singapore dollar (SGD)
per pip.
Following the briefing and practice, subjects completed the
Belief in Luck and Luckiness Scale (Thompson and Prendergast,
2013), administered to divert suspicion from our examination
of cheating behavior. Subjects then performed two blocks
of the dice-rolling paradigm, one primed with disgust facial
expressions, and one primed with neutral facial expressions.
Priming order was counterbalanced across subjects. Each block
consisted of 20 trials of priming and dice-rolling. In between task
blocks, subjects watched a 7-min video on coral reefs to minimize
carry-over effects of the priming (same video clip as Ong et al.,
2014).
At the conclusion of the two task blocks, subjects completed
three further questionnaires: demographic data, the Duke
University Religion Index (Koenig and Bussing, 2010) and the
Disgust Sensitivity Scale-Revised (Olatunji et al., 2007). We then
conducted a debriefing to check if subjects had detected the
subliminal primes or guessed the purpose of the experiment.
Specifically, we asked subjects (1) to guess the purpose of the
experiment, (2) to guess the purpose of the gender discrimination
task, (3) whether they perceived any relationship between the
faces and the dice rolls, (4) if they thought the dice rolls were
fair, (5) if they were aware they could cheat, and (6) if they
actually had cheated. Participants then drew a number from 1 to
40 at random from a tin, and were paid the value of that trial
(see below). All subjects also received an additional, unexpected,
2 SGD for participating in the experiment to raise the average
expected payment to 5.50 SGD.
Experimental Paradigm
The priming paradigm in this experiment was similar to one
we used previously to test the effects of disgust priming on
judgments in moral dilemmas (Ong et al., 2014). During the
task blocks, subjects completed two tasks in alternating order,
a gender-discrimination task adapted from Winkielman et al.
(2005), which was the priming phase, and a slightly modified
dice-rolling task that was used in Jiang (2013) and Ariely
et al. (2014) to assess levels of honesty (Figure 1). Stimuli were
presented on Windows computers using E-Prime 2.0 (Schneider
et al., 2002).
Details of the priming phase have been reported previously
(Ong et al., 2014). Briefly, subjects were first presented with
a forward and backward masked facial prime (16.66ms for
each), with either a disgust or neutral facial expression. The
same person’s neutral-expression face was then presented, and
participants were asked to classify their gender. The disgust
and neutral blocks each had an equal number of male and
female faces, presented in a random sequence. Facial images were
adapted from the Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces (KDEF)
database (Lundqvist et al., 1998).
Following their response to the gender discrimination query,
participants were prompted to choose between “top” or “bottom,”
and to remember their selection. They then rolled a physical
6-sided die and were asked to write down the corresponding
number on a piece of paper. For example, if they rolled a “5,”
they were supposed to record “5” if they had chosen “top,” and
“2” if they had chosen “bottom.” The six possible top-bottom
combinations are presented in Figure 1. This procedure provides
two different ways in which the participant can be dishonest:
either by falsifying the side they had thought of (e.g., recording
“5” when they had selected “top” and rolled a “2”), or by
recording a number that had appeared on neither the top nor the
bottom of the rolled die.
Results
Gender Classification Task
Accuracy on the gender classification task was high (93.5%, SD=
0.7%), indicating that subjects were attending to the stimuli
during the gender discrimination component (and the subliminal
face presentations). We excluded two subjects with low (<80%)
accuracy from subsequent analysis; data from the remaining 48
subjects are reported from this point.
Effect of Coral-Reef Movie Clip on Mood
To minimize carry-over effects of priming from the first to the
second block, participants viewed a documentary video on coral
reefs. Although we did not collect subjective mood ratings in
the current experiment, we did measure them in a previous
study, in which the same video clip was used (Ong et al., 2014).
Subjective disgust, anger, sadness, and happiness were measured
at multiple time points in that experiment. To test whether the
video returned participants to their baseline mood levels in our
previous dataset, we conducted paired-sample t-tests between
ratings on the first (pre-task) mood survey, and post-video
mood levels, and found no significant differences (all differences
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FIGURE 2 | Frequency distribution of reported rolls. (A) by individual number and (B) combining across paired-opposite numbers. The expected frequency of
rolls by chance is plotted on the left of each graph.
p > 0.0125 after correction for multiple comparisons for the 4
moods). This indicates that the coral-reef video has the desired
effect of returning mood to baseline levels.
High Likelihood of Dishonest Reporting
Wefirst tested for evidence of dishonesty across our entire sample
of participants, by examining whether the observed proportions
of reported rolls of each number (1–6) concurred with the
expected proportion for each number across all trials (16.7%)
(Figure 2A). This revealed a highly significant deviation from the
expected uniform proportions (X2 = 87.08, df = 5, p < 10−37;
Cramer’s V = 0.21), indicating an extremely high likelihood that
some subjects were not honestly reporting the outcomes of their
die rolls (percentages: 1 = 10.2%, 2 = 12.5%, 3 = 13.3%, 4 =
20.5%, 5= 22.9%, 6= 20.8%).
To confirm, we compared the mean reported dice roll values
(MRDRV) for each participant, across all trials, against the
expected mean of 3.5. This analysis revealed a significantly higher
MRDRV than would be expected by chance [mean = 3.98, SD =
0.50, t(47) = 6.65, p < 10
−7, d = 0.96]. This indicates that,
as a group, subjects were making dishonest reports by writing
down numbers higher than those that would be expected by
chance. Cheating behavior was also detectable separately in both
the disgust and neutral blocks [disgust: mean = 3.91, SD = 0.59,
t(47) = 4.76; p < 10
−4, d = 0.69; neutral: mean = 4.04, SD =
0.54, t(47) = 6.82, p < 10
−7, d = 0.99].
Two Types of Dishonesty Present
There are two different ways in which a participant can
be dishonest in this paradigm: reporting the chosen side
(top/bottom) dishonestly, or fabricating a value that is on neither
the top nor the bottom of the die. The latter behavior can be
detected by comparing whether there is a significant deviation
from a uniform distribution when combining the paired opposite
sides (1’s+ 6’s, 2’s+ 5’s and 3’s+ 4’s). A chi-square test indicated
that the observed distribution was significantly different from
chance (X2 = 6.11, df = 2, p = 0.047; Cramer’s V = 0.06),
with post-hoc tests showing fewer 1’s + 6’s (X2 = 5.34, df = 1,
p = 0.02; Cramer’s V = 0.05) and marginally more 2’s + 5’s
(X2 = 3.67, df = 1, p = 0.055; Cramer’s V = 0.04) than
FIGURE 3 | Main effect of disgust presentation. Subjects (N = 49) were
slightly less dishonest in the disgust than the neutral condition, but this effect
was not significant.
expected (Figure 2B), indicating that our observed distributions
cannot be accounted for based solely on participants performing
within-pair replacements (e.g., substituting a 5 for a 2 or a 6
for a 1).
Main Effect of Disgust Priming on Dishonesty
We tested the main effect of disgust facial expression priming
by comparing the mean reported roll value between the disgust
and neutral blocks (Figure 3: Neutral, mean = 4.04, SD =
0.54; Disgust, mean = 3.91, SD = 0.59). On average, the mean
reported value was lower in the disgust priming condition (mean
difference = −0.13, SD = 0.54), but this difference reached only
marginal significance [Figure 3, t(47) = −1.68, p = 0.10].
Increased Dishonesty in the Second Task Block
We compared theMRDRV between the first and second blocks of
the task, and found that over-reporting was significantly higher
in the later block [t(47) = −3.10, p = 0.003, d = 0.39]. This
order effect resulted in an average increase in reported roll of 0.22
(1st block: mean = 3.86, SD = 0.60; 2nd block: mean = 4.08,
SD= 0.52).
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FIGURE 4 | Bi-directional relationship between disgust sensitivity and
modulation of dishonesty. The difference in the mean reported dice roll
values between blocks was significantly positively correlated with disgust
sensitivity, indicating replication of the bi-directional function of individual
sensitivity determining the sign and size of moral modulation due to disgust
stimuli.
Disgust Priming Modulates Dishonest Reporting
Based on Individual Sensitivity to Disgust
Our principal aim was to test whether our bidirectional function
(Ong et al., 2014; moral judgment modulation moderated
by individual sensitivity) generalizes to the moral domain
of honesty. To start, we tested the correlation between the
difference inMRDRVs (Disgust—Neutral) and individual disgust
sensitivity (DS) (measured by the DS-R scale). This revealed
a significant positive relationship (Figure 4: r = 0.33, p =
0.02). We proceeded to conduct a One-Way repeated-measures
ANCOVA using DS-R as a covariate to compare the difference
in MRDRV between disgust and neutral blocks. This revealed
a significant effect [F(1,46) = 7.38, p = 0.009, η
2
p = 0.14],
suggesting the successful generalization of our bidirectional
function to the moral domain of honesty.
Our initial analyses revealed that block order had a significant
effect on MRDRV. This suggested that priming order (i.e.,
whether subjects performed the disgust or neutral block first)
may also have had a significant effect on the difference inMRDRV
between conditions (disgust minus neutral). A paired-sample
t-test confirmed this difference [t(47) = −3.09, p = 0.003;
d = 0.89], with clear order-related differences (disgust first: mean
difference = −0.34, SD = 0.49, neutral first: mean difference =
0.10, SD = 0.50). To confirm that our priming manipulation
function was not produced as an artifact of this strong order
effect, we ran a second ANCOVA including the priming order
as a second covariate (in addition to DS-R). This model revealed
a significant prime ∗ order effect [F(1, 45) = 9.92, p = 0.003,
η2p = 0.18], but also resulted in an increase in the main effect of
prime [F(1, 46) = 17.17, p = 0.0001, η
2
p = 0.28].
We also examined whether there was an effect ofmanipulation
order on the disgust sensitivity reported by participants. While
this metric is considered trait-like, with high test-retest reliability,
it is certainly possible that the order of the disgust modulation
could result in alterations in reported disgust sensitivity. We did
not find a significant effect of manipulation order on the disgust
FIGURE 5 | Probability of honest reporting. Expected and observed
cumulative probabilities (subtracted from one) of obtaining mean values of 0–6
for 40 die rolls.
sensitivity scale [disgust first: mean = 2.08, SD = 0.36; neutral
first: mean= 2.12, SD= 0.54; t(46) = −0.29, p = 0.78].
Replicating Analyses Using a Probabilistic
Approach
To confirm that these results were not artifactual, perhaps
due to the MRDRV capturing both the variance associated
with dishonest reporting as well as randomness attributable
to the dice rolls themselves, we repeated the analyses using a
probabilistic approach. This was accomplished by calculating the
likelihood that the MRDRV reported by a subject was obtained
by chance, based on a cumulative distribution function (CDF).
These CDFs were converted to probabilities of honest reporting,
by subtracting the CDF value from 1 (Figure 5). A feature of this
probabilistic model is that it takes into account the directionality
of signed deviations from the expected mean MRDRV of 3.5—it
assumes thatMRDRVs decreasing from 3.5 are increasingly likely
honest reports, while values increasing from 3.5 are increasingly
likely to be dishonest.
Repeating our analyses using the probability of honest
reporting as a dependent variable yielded highly similar results
to those using the MRDRV. The difference in probabilities
(Disgust—Neutral) was correlated with DS-R (r = 0.29, p =
0.048). One-Way repeated-measures ANCOVA with DS-R and
priming order included as covariates again revealed a significant
effect of prime [F(1, 46) = 11.94, p = 0.001, η
2
p = 0.21] and
a significant prime ∗ order effect [F(1, 45) = 7.16, p = 0.01,
η2p = 0.14].
Common Bidirectional Function across Moral
Domains of Harm and Honesty
The above results indicate that the disgust priming effect on
judgments of moral dilemmas generalizes to the moral domain
of honesty. We next sought to test if all these data obeyed the
same bidirectional function. To achieve this, we standardized
the behavioral measures across experiments by converting the
dependent variable in this study (MVRDR, N = 48), as well as
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FIGURE 6 | Common bidirectional function. Data from four independent experimental samples (N = 125), testing the effects of disgust presentation on honesty
and judgment of moral dilemmas. Combined, these data obeyed the same bidirectional function, without significant main effect or interaction with task domain.
our changes in moral acceptability variables from our previous
behavioral studies (N = 54; Ong et al., 2014), and fMRI
experiment (N = 19; Lim et al., unpublished), to z-scores. We
then correlated this entire set of scores with DS-R. This overall
correlation was significant (Figure 6: total N = 121, r =.34, p =
0.0002). Furthermore, One-Way ANCOVA of the z-scored data
with DS-R as a covariate revealed a significant effect of priming
across the four different datasets [F(1,119) = 13.44, p = 0.0003,
η2p = 0.10].
To test whether data across the two moral domains obey the
same function, we performed a linear regression using z-scored
change (disgust minus neutral) as a dependent variable, and DS-
R, study type (dilemmas and honesty), and an interaction term
(study type ∗ DS-R) as predictors. The main effect of moral
domain was not significant (β = −0.08, t = −0.19, p = 0.85),
nor was its interaction with DS-R (β = 0.08,t = 0.19, p = 0.85),
indicating that the slopes of data from the two task paradigms did
not differ significantly.
Relation of Dishonesty to Luck Perception and
Religiosity
Self-reported luck perception was weakly associated with
MRDRV (r = −0.26, p = 0.08); subjects who perceived
themselves as being luckier tended to have more honest
reporting. There was no significant association between
religiosity and MRDRV (r = −0.006, p= n.s.).
Cheating and Lying? Few Subjects Admit to
Dishonesty in Post-task Debriefing
In the post-experiment debriefing, subjects were asked whether
they were aware they could cheat during the experiment, and
whether or not they actually cheated. 34 out of 48 (70.8%)
of participants indicated that they were aware they could be
dishonest, while only 6 out of 48 (12.5%) admitted to dishonest
behavior. Those denying awareness that they could cheat actually
had slightly higher MRDRVs (indicators: mean = 4.03, SD =
0.15; non-indicators, mean= 3.95, SD= 0.83), but this difference
did not reach significance [t(46) = −0.50, p = 0.61].
None of the subjects guessed the purpose of the experiment
or reported detecting the facial primes. None indicated that they
thought that the die was unfair, or that the faces and die rolls were
connected in any way.
Discussion
In this study, we examined whether the effects of disgust
stimuli onmoral judgments of hypothetical personal harmwould
generalize to the domain of dishonesty (Ong et al., 2014). We
find that they do. Moreover, we find not only the presence of an
effect, but that it is indistinguishable from the previously specified
effect—a bi-directional function with individual DS moderating
the direction and size of the effect. This suggests that the same
cognitive and neural mechanisms may underlie the impact of
disgust-expression stimuli on both harm judgments and honesty
decisions. In addition, by utilizing an incentive-compatible
economic task, we show that these effects are not limited to
judgments about third parties in hypothetical situations, but
generalize to outcomes with immediate real-world effects on the
participants.
Disgust Alters Moral Decisions
Numerous experiments have shown that disgust stimuli alter
moral judgments (Chapman and Anderson, 2014). Early studies
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reported that a variety of methods such as the use of dirty
environments (Schnall et al., 2008b) and hypnotic suggestion
of disgust (Wheatley and Haidt, 2005) result in more severe
judgments of moral transgressions. However, other researchers
have recently reported effects in the reverse direction (Cummins
and Cummins, 2012; La Rosa et al., 2012; Olatunji et al.,
2012). These disparate results could be reconciled by our recent
discovery that DS moderates the effect of both subliminal and
consciously presented disgust stimuli on moral judgments (Ong
et al., 2014). Disgust stimuli result in more utilitarian judgments
in individuals with high DS, and more deontological judgments
in those low in DS.
Far fewer studies have examined the effects of disgust stimuli
on moral decisions with real-world or incentive-compatible
outcomes. Two such studies utilized the ultimatum game to
examine this issue, and found opposite directions of effect.
Moretti and di Pellegrino (2010) found that disgust induction
using IAPS pictures caused subjects to reject unfair offers
more frequently than those primed with sad or neutral images,
and Bonini et al. (2011) showed the opposite effect, using
environmental disgust smells as their disgust stimuli. Neither
of these studies reported measures of disgust sensitivity, and
it is possible that their effects are driven by the same bi-
directional function we find, with differences in mean sample
disgust sensitivities driving their differential mean shifts. We
elaborate on this possibility in the following section.
Concurrent Bi-directional Effects of Disgust
Stimuli on Harm and Honesty Judgments
An important conclusion of our previous work was that main
effects of disgust priming on moral decisions might not be
detectable without measuring disgust sensitivity as a moderator
(Ong et al., 2014). Indeed, in the current study, the main effect of
priming was only marginally significant (p = 0.10), and it was
only by covarying individual sensitivity that the manipulation
effect reached significance. This finding accords with other
work showing that disgust sensitivity moderates attitudes toward
perceived moral transgressions and violations of social norms
(Inbar et al., 2009; Chapman and Anderson, 2014).
In our prior behavioral experiment (Ong et al., 2014), we
found that disgust stimuli led high sensitivity participants to find
utilitarian actions more acceptable. We find the same pattern of
effect in the current experiment. In the die-rolling task, disgust
stimuli lead high sensitivity participants to greater reported
MRDRVs—indicating that they are enhancing the reported die
roll, which is the maximizing action as it increases their likely
payoff. Low sensitivity individuals in each experiment showed
increased deontological judgments—lower stated acceptability of
utilitarian harm actions in Ong et al. (2014), and, in the current,
more honest MRDRV reporting.
Interestingly, while these functions match very well, the
maximizing behavior of cheating is not a utilitarian action—it
is maximizing self-oriented payout that does not maximize the
common good. In other words, the disgust primes are not simply
driving behavior toward/away from utilitarian/deontological
actions. Rather, there must be an underlying informational
factor that is being modulated and causing these behavioral
changes. As examples, such behavioral changes may be the
result of modulating the inclusion of information about the
consequences of the actions, such as possible punishments (for
killing one to save many or cheating) or rewards (esteem for
saving lives or monetary). This would suggest that the relative
value of the options is altering, driven either by increases in the
subjective value of rewards, or decreases in the subjective value
of punishments (Becker, 1968). For example, we could speculate
that the disgust primes are altering the degree of concern for
social blame, which if reduced would result in a willingness to
kill one person to save others (vignettes) and a greater likelihood
to cheat in the die-rolling task.
In summary, our data show that disgust stimuli alter moral
decisions beyond hypothetical scenarios to those with real world
outcomes. This is important, as moral dilemmas such as the ones
in our previous experiments have been criticized for having a
large number of uncontrolled variables (Christensen and Gomila,
2012) and may lack external validity (Bauman et al., 2014).
Multiple Effects, One Mechanism?
We found evidence that a single bidirectional function may
govern the results of our experiments across moral domains, by
z-scoring and combining our data across this experiment and
our previous studies on harm judgments. When standardized,
the behavioral change data across studies combined to a
significant bi-directional function, with no significant main
effects or interaction of moral domain. The common function
shows that disgust stimuli are modulating moral judgments in
an indistinguishable manner across these two disparate tasks
(a bidirectional function dependent on individual sensitivity).
Intriguingly, this suggests that the DS-R scale may be capturing
a core individual difference that is responsible for modulating
moral behavior in the presence of disgust across moral
domains. It also suggests the same brain regions may underlie
this translation, with the temporal-parietal junction being a
prime candidate based on our previous research (Lim et al.,
unpublished). This is in spite of the fact that different neural
networks appear to be responsible for processing the unique
facets of harm and dishonesty judgments (Parkinson et al., 2011),
suggesting that our effects operate late in the moral decision-
making process. Furthermore, it is unclear how specific this
effect is, that is, whether it is the result of disgust induction or
a general arousal effect that would be present across emotional
domains. We specifically note that our prior study indicated
that the subliminal presentation of disgust facial expressions did
not result in a significant induction of disgust feelings in our
participants (Ong et al., 2014).
Cheating Is More Prevalent in the Latter Half of
the Task
Replicating the findings of Jiang (2013), we found that MRDRV
was significantly higher in the second than the first block. We
also found a significant interaction effect between the main
effect of priming and priming order. These results highlight the
importance of counterbalancing and statistical control of priming
order in replications of this work.
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Order Effect—Moral Inertia
We found a significant behavioral order effect that interacted
with our manipulation effect. If a participant first experienced the
neutral condition and then the disgust condition, they were more
likely to cheat in the disgust condition. However, if a participant
first experienced the disgust block and then the neutral block,
they were likely to begin cheating in the disgust block and
then continue to do so through the neutral block. We were
able to significantly identify the bi-directional function without
inclusion of the order effect, but the function strengthened by
accounting for the order effect as well.
Previous studies have also identified order effects in moral
decision making, related to the order of stimuli in both
hypothetical (Schwitzgebel and Cushman, 2012) and real
outcomes (Gold et al., 2015). In our initial experiments that
uncovered the bi-directional moderation of disgust sensitivity
through which disgust facial expression alter moral judgment
(Ong et al., 2014), we were careful to control for the order of
the hypothetical vignettes across participants. The current results
clearly show the impact of recent decisions on behavior, with our
participants demonstrating a form of moral inertia—maintaining
the modulation of moral acceptability for the remainder of the
experiment, even with the videos intended to wash out the
manipulation effects.
Conclusion
Subliminal disgust stimuli alter cheating behavior in an
incentive-compatible task based on individual sensitivity to
disgust. This demonstrates the generalizability of this effect across
multiple moral domains and that it extends from hypothetical
dilemmas to real-world outcomes. These unconscious inputs
interact with individual differences in personality to modulate
moral judgments of both harm and dishonesty.
Disgust is just one example of a stimulus type that can
influence real-world moral decision making. Discovering and
reporting the general features of stimuli that affect moral
cognition is an important future endeavor with the potential
to alter the way individuals think about the way they make
moral choices. As even small transgressions can have tremendous
costs in aggregate, the impact of understanding moral cognition
could play a profound role in decision-making in future human
society.
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